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Is the idea of a "federal prosecutor" as a "strategic thinker" an
oxymoron? Over the past few years, as local investigators have
discovered the efficacy of problem-oriented policing in reducing lo-
cal crime rates, some police departments have begun to use tools,
such as the timely and accurate collection of data, to map affirma-
tive crime reduction strategies To some degree, this notion of af-
firmatively anticipating trends and problems and developing goals
that measure achievement not process (for example, reductions in
crime not number of arrests) has also extended to a few local pros-
ecutors offices' where the prosecutor views his role as one piece of
puzzle. While the primary task is the prosecution of cases, these
offices have also begun to work with non-law enforcement agencies
where the early involvement of those agencies in a particular issue
(such as truancy) may prevent the later intervention by the crimi-
nal justice system.
In this revolution, federal prosecutors have sat on the sidelines,
adhering to a traditional model of law enforcement case-processing
in which the prosecutor's exercise of any strategic or problem-solv-
ing function is cabined within a particular case. And the prime
mover who selects which case appears in the prosecutor's ambit (or
the array of cases from which the prosecutor may choose), is the
* Elizabeth Glazer is the Chief of Crime Control Strategies in the United States
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. The views expressed here
do not necessarily represent those of the United States Department of Justice or the
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. For their
insights, criticisms and comments on the ideas in this article, my thanks to Joy K.
Fallon, Hector Gonzalez, Debra Livingston, Gerard E. Lynch, Daniel C. Richman,
Stephen C. Robinson, Amy Solomon and Jeremy Travis.
1. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 562-91 (1997)
(tracing the emergence of this way of thinking).
2. ROGER CONNER AND PATRICK GRIFFIN, COMMUNITY SAFETY LAW: AN
EMERGING LEGAL SPECIALTY (National Institute of Justice 1998) (collecting
examples).
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investigator, not the prosecutor. That order is affirmed by most
federal prosecutors' perception that they are "serving" a "client"
agency. Although the complexity of that service and the skill re-
quired are considerable, the federal prosecutor still operates to a
large extent in an arena constructed by federal investigative agen-
cies. A prosecutor can have a dramatic impact within any particu-
lar case but which cases and what areas will be selected for federal
attention remain an area of largely undisputed agency discretion -
a discretion that itself may be exercised responsively not strategi-
cally. The consequence is that the federal prosecutor - by defin-
ing his role as case-oriented, excludes himself from any meaningful
participation in mapping an effective federal strategy for crime re-
duction and control.
Because neither federal prosecutors nor investigators view them-
selves as accountable for the rises or drops in local crime rates,
they have also been slow both in using timely data collection and
analysis to plot their actions and in measuring the impact of their
efforts by anything more than counting arrests or indictments. Se-
rious theoretical issues about the appropriate role of the federal
government in areas traditionally reserved to the states may also
act as a brake on coordinated and strategic action. I do not mean
to downplay the complex federalism concerns raised by the entry
of the federal government into the investigation and prosecution of
violent crime. But, as a practical matter, it is unlikely that Con-
gress or the courts will, anytime soon, significantly diminish federal
power in this area.
The question then is whether it is sufficient for federal law en-
forcement to play the largely episodic and reactive role they have
assigned themselves? The very freedom of federal law enforcement
from having to walk a beat provides an 6pportunity to develop a
strategy that targets powerful and unique federal laws at particular
problems. While local law enforcement must arrest the murderer
today, even if for a minor violation, federal authorities may have
the time and the laws to investigate the murderer and his entire
crew for subsequent lengthy incarceration. Armed with powerful
federal laws and informed by significant federal cases, federal in-
vestigators and prosecutors could have an impact on urgent local
crime problems - if they could organize their knowledge and har-
ness it to particular objectives in which remedies beyond simple
arrest and conviction would be considered.
Although this approach of analyzing data (both local and fed-
eral) and designing strategies that mobilize the targeted use of both
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federal and local enforcement and non-enforcement remedies
could and should be used across a wide swath of subject areas, this
Article focuses on the violent crime, narcotics and organized crime
dockets.3 Institutionally, there are any number of players in the
federal arena who could organize federal information and re-
sources to identify gaps and mobilize strategies. Ideally, such an
effort would rely upon the cooperative engagement of all facets of
federal and local law enforcement.
This Article explores some of the assets that federal prosecutors
bring to the table in assisting a federalfeffort to reduce violent
crime through the analysis of data, the strategic use of federal laws
and the coordination of federal, state, local and private resources.
First, because federal prosecutors sit at the center of agency inves-
tigations, they have a panoramic view of the agencies' often over-
lapping investigative efforts; and because they see those efforts,
without the filter of any single agency's jurisdictional interests, they
can evaluate the direction of those efforts dispassionately. Second,
prosecutors are familiar with the array of laws - criminal, civil and
administrative - that could be used in a strategic attempt to re-
duce crime. Although as currently employed, federal laws have
had a scattershot effect on crime, they could provide an unparal-
leled opportunity for federal prosecutors to move towards a com-
prehensive and strategic approach to combating crime in both
geographic and subject matter areas.
Leading an affirmative and goal-oriented strategy to reduce vio-
lent crime changes the role that prosecutors have traditionally as-
sumed in combating crime. This new perspective 'shifts the
prosecutor's ambit of concern from any particular case or cases to
the impact that a group of cases have in either a particular geo-
graphic area or particular subject matter area. In addition, once
federal prosecutors begin to think about their work as a specific
method to obtain and maintain reductions in crime, their focus will
3. The area of white-collar crime presents different challenges from the violent
crime/narcotics/organized crime area. For example, because of the extensive and in-
tertwining connections in the criminal community involved in violent crime, a strategy
which tracks the history of "families" of criminal networks, maps critical incidents of
conduct and ultimately prosecutes an extensive organization will have an impact on
local crime rates. In the white:-collar area, however, the criminal community of fraud-
sters may not have the same kinds of connections as a mafia family or a street gang.
And the kind of data collection and analysis that is helpful to identifying patterns will
be very different. It may be that the pattern of cases shows not so much links among
individual criminals as administrative or regulatory loopholes which provide the op-
portunity for criminal activity. Thus, while the remedy may include prosecutions it
will also focus on closing those regulatory gaps'.
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shift from pursuing the arrest-to-appeal trajectory of a particular
case to shaping remedies, including both law-enforcement and non-
enforcement components, which will affect a broader swath of geo-
graphic and subject matter areas. Both features of this shift in the
prosecutor's role will contribute to sustaining crime reductions for
the long-term.
Part I of this Article discusses how, in their traditional role, fed-
eral prosecutors have limited their function to case-processing and
accordingly reduced their natural ability to fashion effective crime-
fighting techniques. Part II explores how certain features of the
prosecutor's function make him well-placed to act as the federal
agencies' strategic thinker. Finally, the Article suggests how the
strategic potential of the prosecutor's role could be realized.
I. The Traditional Model
The traditional federal prosecutor likes to think of himself as the
consummate carnivore: a learned lawyer, a compelling oral advo-
cate, a relentless pursuer of the truth who fights crime by putting
"bad guys" in jail. His allies in this fight are the federal investiga-
tive agencies. Those agencies identify trends in criminal behavior
and "bring" the prosecutor the significant cases. To be sure, any
one agency may miss a significant trend because the way in which
the criminal world is organized and connected is not a perfect re-
flection of the divisions in responsibility and jurisdiction of the law
enforcement world. To a traditional prosecutor, however, that dis-
connect is overcome by the federal investigative agency's responsi-
bility to see and make the connections with her sister agencies both
within and outside the federal system.
Although there is a continuum of experience, the relationship
between prosecutors and investigators is largely shaped by some
basic acceptance that the division of labor expressed in the well-
worn mantra: "We investigate, you prosecute," is an accurate re-
flection of the investigator's and the prosecutor's responsibilities.'
Under this model, the investigator, largely without a prosecutor's
involvement or consultation, conducts an investigation of a particu-
lar target. At the completion of the investigation, shortly before
the arrest (and sometimes shortly afterwards), the agent notifies
the prosecutor of the arrest and, while the prisoner is being
booked, writes up the complaint on which the defendant will be
4. Real life is always messier and more infinite than this description captures.
However, it attempts to generalize accurately in outline, the kind of structure and
assumptions under which the majority of federal prosecutors and investigators labor.
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presented. At this end of the spectrum, usually in the simpler
cases, for example, a narcotics buy-and-bust, the prosecutor may
have minimal knowledge or even no previous knowledge of the
target or the investigation: he may have authorized a subpoena or a
consensual tape recording, but not know the full scope of the
agency's efforts or the target's criminal background.
Some in law enforcement refer to this traditional relationship be-
tween an investigator and a prosecutor as the "thrown over the
wall" model,5 a reference to days, now gone by, in the automotive
industry when the engineering and marketing departments were
distinctly separate operations. Engineering would design a car that
would delight any right-thinking gadget-nik. But when engineering
"threw the design over the wall" to marketing, marketing saw only
an Edsel disaster.6 The example of the progression of the narcotics
buy-bust case, described in the preceding paragraph, is a law en-
forcement version of the "over the wall" phenomenon: it assumes
that there is a neat division between investigation and prosecution,
instead of considering that each investigative step may close off or
open up prosecutorial possibilities. Most significantly, it confines
the prosecutor to the limits of the case because by the time the
prosecutor "receives" the case, it is usually too late to explore use-
fully the connections, possibilities and impact that the case might
have had.7
In other instances, usually the more complex cases, the relation-
ship between the agency and the prosecutor shifts slightly, at least
within the structure of the particular case. In a gang case, for ex-
ample, the prosecutor will be well aware of the investigation. He
conducts the debriefing sessions with potential cooperators and
consults with agents on the direction of the investigation: who or
what records should be subpoenaed, which potential witnesses
should be approached, what the approach should be and what
5. I am grateful to Robert F. Messner, Executive Managing Attorney, Civil En-
forcement, New York City Police Department, for this insight.
6. Id.
7. For example, even in the simple buy-bust, it might have been fruitful to ask
before the arrest whether the drug-dealing is taking place in a neighborhood where
the prosecutor's office is seeing an upsurge in other criminal activity? If so, once the
target is arrested, is it useful to ask him, with some specificity, about that activity? If
the transaction is taking place in a particular building, what does the investigative or
prosecutive agency know about other activity in that building or that quadrant. More
specifically, is there a pattern of conduct that may lead prosecutors to conclude that
the building is suitable for forfeiture action because the landlord has not taken rea-
sonable steps to exclude drug trafficking?
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other investigative agencies or prosecutors might have information
on the case.
At whichever end of the continuum the prosecutor finds himself,
this model - even the more progressive edition - confines the
prosecutor's role to the case itself. Within the case, the prosecutor
may play an important role in making tactical choices. But why the
investigative agency pursued that case and not another one, is not
the prosecutor's concern. In fact, the prosecutor's case-oriented
approach means that he does not consider where his case fits into
the criminal topography of a neighborhood, either as symptomatic
of a general trend in criminal behavior or as exemplary of a part of
a remedy to affect an identifiable crime problem.
The limits of the traditional prosecutor's concerns are the quality
of the evidence and the likelihood of conviction. It is not impor-
tant to the careful and successful prosecution of a drug gang to
know whether crack is a waxing or waning trend. It is not neces-
sary in a racketeering case to know how many murders were com-
mitted in the quadrant of the city in which the enterprise operated.
And it is entirely irrelevant, by any measure by which a federal
prosecutor's office is evaluated and its budget determined, to find
out the effect that any particular federal case had on the crime in-
dicators in the neighborhood in which the prosecution was
brought. The prosecutor seeks information that will help him eval-
uate the strengths and weaknesses of the case. But systematically
seeking out and evaluating the criminological data to help him
make informed decisions generally about where to target his of-
fice's resources is not part of that calculus.
The prosecutor's reliance on the federal agencies to shape his
docket is particularly perplexing when one scrutinizes the prove-
nance of the agencies' strategies. Guided by their headquarters'
nationwide directives, an agency may decide that this year, drug
kingpins are the problem and next year violent crime is. But
whether to go after kingpins or murders in the Bronx or in Marin
County and how to execute that strategy in a meaningful way, tai-
lored to the infinite variations of crime conditions from neighbor-
hood to neighborhood, is not a feature of that strategy. At the
local office level, where one might imagine the tailoring of those
broad directives into executable strategies might take place, the
agencies often do not have direct access to the kind of data that
would enable them to, for example, identify all the drug kingpins in
the Bronx and then determine those worthy of initial prosecution.
Perhaps, more significantly, the agencies have no incentive to ob-
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tain and analyze that data as they do not hold themselves directly
accountable for local crime conditions.
Without any determinative role in shaping his docket and di-
recting his resources, the carnivorous prosecutor has defined him-
self out of a crime-fighting role. He is ferocious and fair-minded in
his case; but is he doing anything more than case-processing? He
"takes" a case presented by an investigative agency when it fits cer-
tain legal, ethical and, sometimes policy, standards.8 The case-
processing prosecutor's job is complete when the defendants in
that case are either convicted and their appeals are exhausted, or
they are acquitted.
This approach to prosecution is endorsed by every measure of
the Department of Justice ("DOJ" or "Justice") which, when it
comes to the "war on crime," relies upon "body counts" to mea-
sure success. Every month DOJ collects from its prosecutors an
array of management information intended to be used to demon-
strate the efficacy of its offices' crime-fighting machines. For in-
stance, DOJ measures the number of hours attorneys spend in
court and on what subjects; it collects how many indictments have
been filed, pleas taken, convictions obtained, and appeals affirmed.
But do these "body counts" measure what could be the real impact
of federal prosecutorial resources on crime: have the indictments,
convictions and appeals done anything in each of the neighbor-
8. Those policy standards are more often than not oriented to case-specific pa-
rameters. For example, many United States Attorney's Offices have guidelines re-
garding the minimum quantity of drugs that will qualify a case for federal prosecution.
Yet one could imagine a scenario in which targeted federal prosecution of certain
repeat offenders for relatively low levels of narcotics could have a dramatic impact on
a neighborhood's well-being.
A building may have been taken over by a group of crack dealers who traffic in
small quantities of drugs. They have been arrested numerous times selling drugs in
and around the buildings and each time have been released by state court on bail after
a misdemeanor charge or less. Through a federal lens, their years of low-level, crack
dealing as a group may aggregate into significant weight and potential years of impris-
onment. When brought in front of a federal magistrate on the matter of bail, the
string of narcotics arrests in the same location bespeaks a potential danger to the
community that might earn them a remand. While in prison awaiting trial, several of
the defendants may decide to cooperate and legitimate tenants, emboldened by the
disappearance of dealers, may also come forward. Through that cooperation and the
tenant information, prosecutors may learn that the open and notorious drug-dealing
in the building was accommodated by the landlord in exchange for cash payments.
With that and other evidence the building is forfeited and subsequently re-sold, at a
nominal sum, to a neighborhood housing group. A prosecutor's office holding fast to
its minimum guidelines would not have taken this case; however, a prosecutor looking
for a lasting impact on crime conditions in the neighborhood would have achieved
that through this chain of events.
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hoods where prosecutors have worked to reduce the level of vio-
lent crime and enhance the quality of life for the residents of those
communities?
What is the alternative to case-processing for a federal prosecu-
tor's office? It could move away from the familiar "body count"
world of "responding" to "client" agencies to an impact world of
working with the investigative agencies to determine what strate-
gies would reduce crime both immediately and for the long-term.
This shift is a difficult one to make both because it is easier to
count bodies than to measure impact and because being serious
about impact (that is, going beyond the "end" of the case to ensure
that neighborhood crime conditions remain low) smacks faintly of
"soft" vegetarian concerns. At first blush, such concerns appear
antithetical to the carnivorous instinct of prosecutors and investiga-
tors that their job is over once the "bad guy" is in jail. But, this
more comprehensive and perhaps more "vegetarian" approach
provides, in fact, a tougher stance against crime because, although
concerned about the individual case, it is focused on how arresting
particular defendants advances a broader strategy to reduce crime
in a particular area.
This crime-fighting prosecutor plays a different role in which
case-processing is an important part, but only a part, of a larger
design. He uses his position at the crossroads of investigative in-
formation and his fluency in the laws to survey the landscape of
criminal conduct and deploy appropriate and available resources in
targeted strikes against particular problems. The solutions he em-
ploys may not rely upon incarceration as the sole remedy or upon
law enforcement agencies as the only remedial mechanism. Where
success is measured by sustained crime reduction, the true crime-
fighting prosecutor may find himself working with school districts,
neighborhood groups, with criminal and civil laws or municipal
regulations, to ensure that crime reductions obtained by arrests are
maintained by ongoing social controls.
From time to time flashes of this strategic approach, grounded in
analysis of available data, have appeared on a prosecutor's radar
screen, leading to remarkable results. During the 1980s when Ru-
dolph Giuliani was the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, he spearheaded investigations and prosecu-
tions of the five La Cosa Nostra crime families who operated in
New York. He joined the success of those criminal prosecutions 9
9. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno et al., 85 Cr. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (prosecu-
tion of the "Commission," a body consisting of the ranking members of the five New
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with a broader attack, by way of civil injunctive power, on mob
infiltration of legitimate businesses in New York.10 When Giuliani
became the Mayor of the City of New York in 1993, he also mobil-
ized the city's regulatory powers to constrict further mob influence
in an array of industries." For all these successes,,the methods de-
veloped were neither institutionalized into the way the United
States Attorney's Office does business, nor translated by the inves-
tigative agencies to other subject matter areas.
II. Fixing What Is Wrong With the Traditional Model of the
Prosecutor's Role
Over the past six years, federal prosecutors have begun system-
atically to stake out territory traditionally dominated by district at-
torneys, most strikingly in the area of violent street crime.' As
federal prosecutors have become more deeply involved in violent
crime prosecutions, the frailties of the traditional case-processing
model of prosecutorial behavior have inevitably been exposed.
The contrast between the method used to select, investigate and
prosecute targets in traditional areas of federal involvement and in
the new territory of violent crime highlights how a federal prosecu-
tor may find his role and the effect of his actions changing from
reactive case-processing to strategic deployment of federal re-
York City crime families); United States v. Salerno et al., 86 Cr. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(prosecution of the hierarchy of the Genovese crime family; United States v. Persico
et al., 84 Cr. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (prosecution of the hierarchy of the Calombo crime
family).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 88 Civ. 4486
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, 663
F.Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (granting preliminary injunction against cement workers
union).
11. See Randy Kerry, Bill Gives City New Powers to Fight Crime at Markets, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1996, B2 (discussing New York City legislation authorizing adminis-
trative measures to combat organized crime at the City's wholesale food markets, and
strengthening measures already instituted for the Fulton Fish Market); see also David
Stout, With New Waste Commission,Mayor Vows to End "Mob Tax", N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 1996, at 39 (reporting on measure signed by Mayor Guiliani creating the Trade
Waste Commission to combat organized crime's influence in private trash hauling).
12. The DOJ officially inaugurated an Anti-Violent Crime Initiative in March of
1994, which asked United States Attorneys to work with local communities to address
their most pressing violent crime problems. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTI-
VIOLENT CRIME INITIATIVE: THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT (February 1995). At the time of the inauguration of this program some United
States Attorney's Offices had already been working on street violence for some time.
See Matthew Purdy, Using the Racketeering Law to Bring Down Street Gangs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at Al (reporting that the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York had been targeting street gangs with RICO for the
previous two years).
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sources (sometimes in conjunction with other non-federal re-
sources) against particular problems. As illustrated below, the
federal prosecutor entering this new area may find his role chang-
ing first within the case itself, as he works with local investigators
who may not know federal law or procedure, just as the federal
prosecutor may not be familiar with methods used in investigating
local crimes such as murder. This new affirmative role will eventu-
ally lead the prosecutor to a recognition of how the case is inter-
twined with other neighborhood conditions, as he builds, for
example, the simple murder case into a federal gang case. Finally,
as he sees the impact that a particular case has in a neighborhood,
he may begin to seek out the data that will permit him to identify
similar patterns and problems in other neighborhoods that could
be addressed through a similar strategy. 13
A federal prosecutor who is working a neighborhood gang case
finds himself in a different role from a federal prosecutor working
in traditionally federal areas of concern, for example, bank fraud.
In a bank fraud case, the investigating agency usually has a well-
established and exclusive relationship with a federally chartered
bank. A bank that has been defrauded knows which squad to call
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). The FBI squad
responsible for those fraud investigations has been working with
the federal statutes long enough to know how to conduct the inves-
tigation until the case is ready to bring to a prosecutor for indict-
ment or further scrutiny.
A completely different set of expectations and knowledge inform
the dynamic in a violent crime prosecution. It is highly unlikely
that investigators, either local or federal will "bring" a ready-made
gang case to a prosecutor. Except in exceptionally sophisticated
law enforcement circles, the more likely course is that the putative
gang case will begin with a single homicide that the state, for evi-
dentiary or procedural reasons, cannot prosecute. In this kind of
case, the police will usually contact the federal prosecutor rather
than their counterpart in the federal investigative agency because
the question the cop wants answered - "Do I have enough evi-
dence to arrest the target?" - is one the prosecutor is uniquely
13. As noted throughout this Article, this is not a role that a prosecutor can or
should play alone. Depending on the conditions in each locality, district attorneys,
police chiefs, mayors, federal investigative agency heads or others may play a more or
less prominent role in planning comprehensive crime reduction strategies. Here, the
particular characteristics of the federal prosecutor's responsibilities that permit him to
make significant contributions to such a strategy are explored.
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equipped to handle. The federal prosecutor will introduce the local
investigative agency to an array of options, limits and ways of struc-
turing and developing proof in the federal system with which the
local investigator may not be familiar.
The local investigating agency's lack of familiarity with federal
substantive and procedural law will also require a closer engage-
ment by the prosecutor in the investigation than he may have had
in the initial stages of a bank fraud investigation. This role, in turn,
will push the prosecutor to think tactically, at least within the limits
of the case, and most likely beyond those limits, as the single mur-
der case presented becomes the first link in a larger impact case.
Because the likely outcome is that the federal gang case will look
quite different - in size and scope - than the initial murder case
presented by the police, the prosecutor will also begin to view the
array of federal laws and rules with more scrutiny: the ability exists
through these laws to arrest not simply the one defendant for the
murder but his entire crew on their expanse of crimes with which
they held the neighborhood hostage. Here, the prosecutor can
make the difference between simply chalking up another arrest or
making an impact on crime conditions within a neighborhood.
Because it is the prosecutor who has the direct connections with
the federal investigative agencies, it also falls to the prosecutor to
determine whether there are intersections between the case on
which the police have focused and cases that other federal investi-
gative agencies might be working in the same neighborhood. Fi-
nally, in those jurisdictions where, the police have begun to chart
the impact that a particular case has on the crime statistics of a
neighborhood, they may push the prosecutor out of his case-centric
view to a vantage point in which geographically targeted areas be-
come the unit of concern.
This example highlights a number of ways in which a federal
prosecutor may find himself at the center of a strategy to address
neighborhood crime problems. Although this example begins with
a single case, it demonstrates how the approach used in that case
could be the first link in changing the way a prosecutor thinks -
pushing him to the next step of using data to select areas where his
particular skills will have a measurable impact. To his surprise, the
federal prosecutor may find that his position confers on him untap-
ped advantages in planning strategic deployment of resources
against a particular crime problem.
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A. A Federal Prosecutor's Strategic Assets
1. Structural
Federal law enforcement agencies are highly balkanized in their
approach to crime. In New York City, for example, there are at
least twenty federal agencies working in various areas of overlap-
ping as well as exclusive jurisdiction. 14 For an array of reasons
(some inadvertent, some intentional) not every agency knows
whether another may have a parallel, on-going investigation. For
example, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF")
may be investigating gun running out of a grocery store in which
the Department of Agriculture is investigating food stamp fraud.
There is no natural connection between the two agencies and no
particular reason why these two agencies would think, on a regular
basis, to coordinate their efforts. Yet, in this example, their investi-
gations will certainly yield information of mutual interest, as their
targets, their witnesses and their proof overlap.
In other cases, the connections may be less direct but potentially
just as important if captured. For example, Secret Service may
arrest an individual suspected of cloning phones. The Secret Ser-
vice's interest in that person's information will relate to matters of
the agency's jurisdiction: does the defendant know who the source
of the clones is, can he help the agency to build an investigation of
the leaders of the cloning operation? It may well turn out that the
defendant is too low on the ladder to be able to offer helpful infor-
mation and so, in the ordinary course, he will likely plead guilty to
the phone charge on which he was arrested. But suppose the FBI
or the police department has an investigation on the Latin Kings
whose Supreme Crown happens to live next door to the clone
phone defendant's apartment? Now, the Secret Service's defend-
ant may become very important. He may be able to identify pho-
tographs of other gang members who visit the Supreme Crown; he
14. See William A. Geller & Norval Morris, Relations Between Federal and Local
Police, 15 MODERN POLICING 231, 243 (1992) (noting fifty federal law enforcement
agencies with the authority to carry firearms, conduct searches and make arrests); see
e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA"), Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms ("ATF"), United States Postal Inspection Service, Department of
Defense, Department of State, Department of Labor, Department of Health and
Human Services, Department of the Interior, Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, Department of Agriculture, Secret Service, United States Park Service,
Internal Revenue Service, United States Customs Service, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, United States Department of Proba-
tion, Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General.
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may have observed when "Universals" are held. These connec-
tions, however, whether between ATF and Agriculture, in the first
instance, or Secret Service and the FBI or the police in the second
instance, exist only in the world of serendipity. Sometimes institu-
tional rivalries between investigative agencies make it unlikely this
information will be known or shared. More often, there is no sim-
ple and invisible mechanism to make the many connections that
exist among the multitude of investigative agencies and their many
targets.
In a world, however, in which the federal prosecutor plays a
crime-fighting instead of case-processing role, serendipity gives
way to methodical and forensic connection-making. The federal
prosecutor already sits at the crossroads of each of these investiga-
tions and cases. He has cut the subpoenas to the grocery store in
the Agriculture case and authorized the consensual recordings in
the ATF case. He has sat in on the debriefings of Secret Service's
putative clone phone cooperator and viewed the surveillance pho-
tographs of the "Universals" that the Supreme Crown has been
leading. Thus, he has the opportunity, if not yet the tools and the
role,15 to make each of the connections among the many players on
the street who do not follow the same institutional divides that fed-
eral, state and local agencies do. Because in most prosecutors' of-
fices, no single person will be assigned to all those cases, the
crucial question becomes whether there is a mechanism that can
realize the prosecutor's placement at the center of this flow of in-
formation and make the connections methodically.16
2. Analytical
The federal prosecutor also stands in a different relation to the
evidence than any other agency. Each agency has its mission to
fulfill, usually related to the subject matter of its jurisdiction. Thus,
INS's primary concern is the identification and prosecution of ille-
gal aliens; while the Department of Labor's primary concern may
be the identification and suppression of unfair labor practices in
sweatshops; the FBI's primary concern may be the cracking of an
international alien smuggling ring; and the police department's
public morals division may be concerned with the proliferation of
houses of prostitution. In some cases, each of these areas of con-
cern and responsibility may be connected to one another. For ex-
15. See infra Part III.
16. See id.
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ample, it may be that the smuggling ring that the FBI is
investigating brings illegal aliens into the United States where the
INS is charged with finding them. It may also be that the witnesses
the FBI wants to use in its smuggling case are also the targets of
INS's prosecutorial efforts as well as the victims and witnesses to
the unfair labor practices that the Department of Labor is trying to
uncover. And the women that Public Morals is rounding up may
have been forced into prostitution by the leader of the smuggling
ring as a method of paying off their transportation debt.
Who puts the pieces of this puzzle together so that every piece of
overlapping evidence is used to ensure that the crimes of degrada-
tion that this vignette illustrates do not continue? No single inves-
tigative agency in this scenario has the interest or incentive to
devote significant resources to a case that will go well beyond the
agency's primary mission. Furthermore, criminal sanctions may
not be the best remedy for the array of issues raised by this exam-
ple. One could imagine a solution that would embrace civil and
regulatory remedies in the mix with criminal prosecutions with re-
spect to some of the immigration and labor violations. To get to
those remedies, information from a number of sources - munici-
pal Departments of Consumer Affairs and Buildings, to name but
two - might become important in understanding the full scope of
the violations and possible remedies. Moreover, sustaining crime
reductions for the 1ong-term may require the participation of those
or other non-law enforcement agencies in employing the remedy.
A federal prosecutor brings not only a unique mix of training
and knowledge to this situation, but also a panoramic perspective.
The prosecutor is the only player on the law enforcement side who
is not committed, simply by agency affiliation, to weight one sub-
ject matter more heavily than another. Although each agency's
mission is to fight crime within their delineated jurisdiction, the
prosecutor's mission is to fight crime regardless of agency prov-
inces. Whether more than one agency is necessary to develop a
case is not the prosecutor's central concern in determining how a
case or investigation should be put together. Similarly, what role
each of the participating agencies plays (for example, which is the
"lead" agency and who gets the credit for which arrests), although
a matter of concern in managing the logistics of a case and ensuring
a harmonious and productive working relationship, is not the cen-
tral motivating force for the prosecutor in how the case is "made."
This perspective which emphasizes strategy impact over agency di-
visions, is .one that the prosecutor, .by virtue of his responsibilities,
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will naturally possess. As the "neutral" and convening party of the
investigative agencies, the prosecutor may be best able to convey
persuasively to the many agencies involved in a complex case why
one agency's work will be the basis for a different agency's arrests.
For example, a targeted use of building forfeiture to eliminate
the most egregious examples of crime concentration within a
neighborhood may employ the FBI's forfeiture team as the pri-
mary investigative agency. But the FBI's work-will need to make
use of narcotics arrests in and around that building or debriefings
of defendants from that neighborhood done by the DEA or the
police department. Similarly, in a police department effort to re-
duce car thefts, it may transpire that the thefts are the result of
organized rings who steal the cars for export to other countries. In
such a situation, the police department (and ultimately a federal
agency such as the FBI or Customs) may want to make a case that
is built on important information available only from the Coast
Guard which may board the ships, examine manifests and research
Vehicle Identification Numbers ("VIN") to trace the pedigree (le-
gitimate or criminal) of the vehicles.
The cooperation of the DEA and the police department in the
one instance, and the Coast Guard in the next, will be crucial to the
successful completion of these cases. But it may be that no single
agency has the institutional incentives to obtain the cooperation of
the other agencies. In the car case, the police department's interest
may end at the water's edge; the Customs Service's -interest may
focus on the containers and their destination, but leave behind the
indigenous rings of thieves. Finally, it may turn out that the most
effective method of suppression of car thefts only incidentally en-
tails criminal arrests.
For example, it may be that chop shops play the crucial and piv-
otal role between the rings that steal the cars and the figures who
organize the shipments overseas. Thus, shutting down the chop
shops could be the most effective method of reducing the incentive
to the street groups to steal the cars and enhancing the risk to the
shippers of exporting the cars.
But are criminal sanctions the most effective deterrent to the
chop shop operators? For a first time offender, the federal sen-
tencing guidelines mandate a term of no less than zero to six
months and no more than fifteen to twenty-one months;17 in the
state, first time offenders face the possibility of conviction on a
17. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2B6.1
(1998).
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Class E Felony, but typically receive a $250 fine, and no imprison-
ment.18 More painful to the chop shop operators than criminal
prosecution may be the cutting off of any financial rewards. Such a
strategy may start with temporarily closing the shops through the
use of municipal nuisance abatement ordinances; but it might end
with a federal civil suit that puts a network of chop shops under
some kind of monitor, or it might employ municipal taxing and reg-
ulation mechanisms. The work underlying determining the appro-
priate remedy will include, not only collecting all the criminal
violations the shops have accumulated, but also scrutinizing their
records with the Department of Consumer Affairs which may have
licensed the shops and examining the records of the Department of
Sanitation which is responsible for collecting abandoned vehicles
from the street - vehicles whose VINs may now be affixed to the
cars on a freighter to another country. In this example, one can see
how quickly a simple car theft case could metamorphose into a se-
ries of cases and actions with a much more far-reaching impact on
the problem of theft than any single arrest made by any single
agency. This describes an approach that is still reactive and incre-
mental, but may well provide the intermediate step towards affirm-
ative and analytic use of data to identify crime problems and
solutions. A prosecutor, properly trained, could enhance a case be-
yond a simple accrual of arrests and jail time into a series of reme-
dies premised on crime control and reduction.
3. Legal
The familiar role of the prosecutor as legal advisor to the investi-
gative agencies can also play out in another less familiar role.
What the laws, both substantively and procedurally permit or for-
bid determine at every stage how an investigation or prosecution
will unfold and whether it will be successful or not. Under the
traditional "throwing over the wall" model of prosecution, the re-
sults of that process are largely unintentional. The prosecutor
makes do with whatever the evidence is and deals with the conse-
quences of how the evidence was obtained in determining how to
proceed. And because the case, thrown over the wall, is presented
as a finished package, most opportunities to view and use that case
as a piece of a larger array of crime problems or to develop reme-
dies beyond incarceration are lost.
18. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415(a)(1) (McKinney 1999).
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For example, the immigration service may bring a simple case
relating to one alien's illegal re-entry into the United States. In the
normal course, a prosecutor will accept the case for prosecution.
But a single case could also be the opening wedge or one in a pat-
tern that could expose a large-scale alien-smuggling and forced
prostitution ring. Or in a car-stop by the police department, the
police may discover an exotic and complicated "trap" used to store
money, narcotics and guns. Ordinarily such a case would be prose-
cuted by the state. But, imagine that by tracking down the garage
which installed, not only that "trap" but many more like it for
other traffickers, one could chart the beginning of an investigation
to uncover a large-scale money-laundering case? In either case,
should the prosecutor wait for the serendipity that some informant
will expose the rings? Or are there more methodical routes that
could be used to identify these patterns and possible responses ear-
lier in the schemes?
If a prosecutor has made the shift from "body count" prosecu-
tions to "impact" prosecutions, it is not enough - for the prosecu-
tor or the investigator - to know, generically, that illegal re-entry
or money-laundering is a crime and to prosecute the case
presented by the agency. For a prosecutor interested in a case with
an impact, embedded in a strategy aimed at a particular problem,
every aspect of the investigation has to be tested and analyzed in
the light of all available laws and regulations.
In the simple federal murder case - for example, the murder by
two drug dealers of a police officer working in a federal task force
during a buy and bust case - it would be easy in the body count
world to accept the package for prosecution with the witnesses de-
briefed and the forensics completed. And important values would
be served by the simple prosecution of that case, a vindication of
the federal interest in the safety of its agents as well as the broader
interests of society in punishing the murderer and deterring others
from similar criminal conduct. But in the impact world, the alterna-
tive - while embracing and vindicating those values - looks very
different and has the prosecutor playing a different kind of role at
every stage in the proceedings.
First, the prosecutor would want to know every molecule of the
criminal histories of the drug targets with whom the police officer
dealt. These histories would provide an insight into, not simply the
particular two people who murdered the officer and the events of
the afternoon on which the two targets killed the officer, but the
context in which they operated. Did the murder take place during
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a drug deal gone out of control? Was this deal part of a course of
conduct that extended over a period of years? Were the murderers
dealers or robbers? Were the two killers the only people involved
in the drug operation or did their criminal histories and other
sources indicate that they played a particular role in a larger organ-
ization? Was the apartment in which the officer was killed a build-
ing in which a landlord had accepted a pay-offs so dealers could use
the flats as stash houses or for packaging operations? And did the
previous history of the two killers and their fifteen associates show
repeated arrests in that building?
Why are these questions of any significance to a prosecutor? Be-
cause the answer to each question determines whether the case is
best prosecuted federally or locally (or split between the two au-
thorities) and under what laws; that, in turn, determines whether
the rules of engagement between the investigators and their wit-
nesses follow state or federal laws. Those rules, in turn, will deter-
mine what evidence is admissible in the case or cases. The nucleus
of the case may be the murder. Further investigation may develop
a larger drug-trafficking, money-laundering or robbery scheme or
reveal a group or groups involved in a variety of criminal acts. In
addition to these cases (or this case, depending on how the evi-
dence is put together), the possibility of federal forfeiture may be
available. The decision to pursue the forfeiture action will also af-
fect how the investigation is conducted and what kind of long-term
remedies are available. For example, upon forfeiture the building
may be sold to a non-profit group that would be committed to re-
turning the building to a stable residential cornerstone of the
neighborhood.
The prosecutor who thinks strategically will not only look be-
yond the murderers to the group or groups they work with, but will
also ask: how prevalent is this activity in other parts of the city?
What kind of comprehensive and targeted method could be used to
shut down those other networks? Perhaps focusing on the financ-
ing of the drug networks would be more effective and less danger-
ous than continued buy-bust operations. Or it might be worthwhile
exploring the deterrent effect of an analogue of the Boston Gun
Project's method: providing powerful disincentives to drug dealers
by directly communicating to them the likely consequences of their
criminal activities combined with selective and exemplary prosecu-
THINKING STRATEGICALLY
tion of those continuing violators.19 Finally, there may well be an
important role the non-enforcement community can play in main-
taining steep reductions in crime, Whether in buying and stabilizing
forfeited buildings or some other role.
Thus, the area that even the most traditional investigators and
prosecutors would acknowledge is the arena of a prosecutor's pri-
mary jurisdiction - the interpretation and execution of the laws -
becomes important player at every turn, in not simply the prosecu-
tion, but the investigation. The laws and procedures will guide
whether pieces of evidence are or are not admissible and thus
whether a case will end up in federal or state court. This kind of
analysis is more akin to the classic prosecutor's role of thinking
inside the case. But by pushing each aspect of the case and by
trying to put it in the context of a neighborhood's or city's crime
conditions, even a single case can provide the starting point for a
prosecutor to begin to think strategically about the broader trends
of which a single case may be symptomatic and what resources are
needed to have an impact on that larger problem.
4. Impact, Connection and Geographic Targets
In the traditional model of joint federal and local efforts to com-
bat violent crime, the federal role has been, for the most part, to
prosecute the exemplary case. In the very interesting and success-
ful Boston Gun Project, the United States Attorney's Office played
an important role in bringing the exemplary case against a particu-
lar neighborhood tough - a case that was credited with serving as
a deterrent to the tough's associates and followers. That kind of
role is an important one for federal prosecutors to play: with a min-
imum display of force, select a single target whose swift and certain
prosecution and severe punishment will serve as an effective moral-
ity play for his associates.2 °
But, strategically viewed, federal laws permit - if federal agen-
cies and information are properly mobilized - an affirmative and
comprehensive attack .on arrays of interlocking criminal associa-
tions within a particular neighborhood. Most criminal neighbor-
hood networks operate in the same way as legitimate
19. For an excellent description of the Boston Gun Project, the strategy and its
effects, see David Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings,
and A Theory of Prevention, 31 VALP. L. REV. 449 (1997).
20. See id. at 463-68. In Boston that example was successful most notably because
the enforcement team deliberately, methodically and effectively used formal and in-
formal neighborhood networks of communication among the target's associates to get
out the message of the new rules of the road. See id.
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neighborhood networks. In the legitimate world, a resident knows
where to buy his food, fix his shoes, get his clothes cleaned. In the
criminal world, the drug dealer knows where to get his phones
cloned, his cars outfitted with traps, his money sent out the coun-
try, his rivals taken care of.21
For the most part, federal law enforcement misses those connec-
tions because at least five different agencies deal with the example
in the preceding sentence. In addition, law enforcement is not used
to dealing with ongoing neighborhood networks. Once the group
of robbers has been arrested, those files are closed, the photo
books are boxed, the connections in the case exist only in the
minds of the agents or detectives, or perhaps the prosecutors, that
worked the case. Six years later, though, that group of robbers
may be released from jail: as they rejoin each other in their old
neighborhood and return to their old associates and haunts, law
enforcement tries to stitch back together its old knowledge of the
group and its criminal activity.
Working in partnership with both local and federal investigative
agencies, federal prosecutors can serve as the intersection of these
cases and events. This role does not signify, by any means, that all
the cases would or should be federally prosecuted. Indeed, such an
outcome would be a leading indicator that the attempt to think
strategically and comprehensively to adapt appropriate resources
to the array of crimes has failed. But a federal prosecutor can
make at least two important contributions. First, he can mobilize
comprehensive federal laws designed to root out the very networks
that continue to operate and provide the sustenance for a neigh-
borhood's continuing crime conditions, even once the "big fish"
are incarcerated. Racketeering laws, gun trafficking laws and for-
feitures, each in a different way, provide methods to attack defini-
tively and at their core certain persistent crime problems.22
Second, federal prosecutors are well-positioned to highlight the
connections between categories of federal cases that are now sim-
ply part of their archives of "boilerplate." For example, it is stan-
dard fare in obtaining a search warrant in an apartment to search
for narcotics, for the judicial officer also to authorize a search for
guns on the theory that guns are "tools of the narcotics trade."
Case after case has demonstrated the strength of this connection.
But could more be done with this connection between drugs and
21. Elizabeth Glazer, Treat New York's Gangs Like a Crime Family, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1998, at A15.
22. See infra Part III.
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guns? It could be useful to overlay a map of recovered crime guns
on an outline of neighborhood's drug markets to determine sys-
tematically, not serendipitously, which groups are being supplied
their weapons, and by which states. Federal gun trafficking laws
provide a unique and effective method to use this data to target the
flow of crime guns between states.
Employing either strategy, or even thinking of using either
method of analysis, crucially depends upon the federal prosecutor
moving from a case-centric view of the world to a neighborhood
impact-oriented view. Although federal prosecutions may repre-
sent only a small percentage of the prosecutions brought nation-
wide,23 it is likely that those prosecutions, constitute prosecutions
of the serious players in each of these neighborhoods. But the pre-
sumption upon which this deployment of power must rest is that
the federal prosecutor knows where to go because he understands
the crime context of the city in which he works.
5. Where is the Federal Office Of Strategic Planning?
In large cities where the police departments have been deeply
engaged in developing effective, strategic responses to crime, the
departments generally rely upon a division whose mission it is to
develop and implement those strategies, responding to block by
block conditions. In Boston, the police department has a unit
within the Police Commissioner's office called the Office of Strate-
gic Planning and Resource Development. Among other things,
this office coordinates yearly crime reduction plans and goals
crafted by each district commander in consultation with commu-
nity leaders.24 In New York City, the Chief of Department (the
ranking uniformed member of the department) and the Deputy
Commissioner of Operations are responsible for analyzing the de-
partment's crime statistics and ensuring, block by block and case by
case, that precinct commanders are following through on depart-
mental initiatives and strategies.
No such equivalent office of planning and accountability exists in
the federal system, either in the investigative agencies or in the
prosecutors' offices - whether district by district or centrally from
the Department of Justice. It is true that the FBI collects and dis-
23. ABA TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALI-
ZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 19 (1999) (noting that federal prosecutions comprise less
than 5% of all the prosecutions in the nation).
24. BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR NEIGHBORHOOD POLIC-
ING (July 1996).
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tributes the statistics for the Unified Crime Report each year,25 and
from time to time the Department of Justice or one of its compo-
nent agencies, such as the FBI, might issue a "strategy" indicating
the areas of particular interest and focus. However, the FBI's col-
lection of data is not used as the basis for planning strategy or tac-
tics on the national or local federal office level - perhaps because
the information is neither geographically specific nor timely
enough to rely upon in making strategic decisions.26 And the
agency guidance indicating the general areas of focus and concern
for the department does not translate to the kind of area and crime
specific response that is oriented to impact cases. Indeed, the per-
formance indicators for these agencies do not include any responsi-
bility for significant drops in crime.
Two major obstacles stand in the way of a federal investigative
agency describing and implementing a strategy that is specific to a
district's crime conditions and that will have a beneficial effect on
those conditions. First, in the area of violent crime, a federal inves-
tigative agency must rely upon the local investigators for a detailed
knowledge of a neighborhood's or city's crime conditions. Some-
times a history of rivalry or dissension may make it difficult to get
an accurate or complete sense of the trends and specifics of an
area's problems. Even in instances where past relations have been
harmonious, sometimes the local investigators may not have ana-
lyzed the data in a way that is useful for a federal agency. For
example, a police department may be initially concerned with pre-
cinct conditions. But they may not be able to assess accurately
whether a particular precinct's conditions are linked to a series of
events or crimes that cut across precinct boundaries. In the inter-
est of solving a particular crime now, they may be willing to miss
the target's associates and past criminal histories. The police de-
partment's legitimate interest in immediate arrest and suppression
of "hot spots" may mean that certain worthy targets, who require
longer-term efforts, slip out of range. For example, a peak in kill-
ings four years ago may point to a turf fight between two gangs in
which one gang emerged as victor. Having vanquished its rivals,
25. Federal Bureau of Investigation; Crime Statistics and Reports (visited Feb. 20,
1999) <http://www.fbi.gov/crimestats.htm>.
26. See infra Part III.A. for further exploration of how such analytical and strate-
gic help could be employed at the local federal district level. At the national level,
one might think such a capability would be helpful to the Attorney General, or the
Secretary of the Treasury (and Secretaries of HUD and HHS, among others) to, at a
minimum, determine how to deploy federal resources to combat national trends and
coordinate the spending of federal dollars to assist local efforts.
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the triumphant gang may avoid police scrutiny because of its com-
plete dominance of the neighborhood as well as judicious and dis-
crete street-selling techniques. The gang is no longer a police
target, but remains a potentially dangerous enterprise which may
be vulnerable to federal investigative techniques, such as the use of
accomplices to uncover and prosecute the group's crimes.
Second, a federal investigative agency is not always best placed
to fashion a comprehensive strategy because each agency has a par-
ticular mission that is pre-eminent in its view of priorities: the FBI
in certain organized criminal groups; the INS in large scale alien-
smuggling; the Secret Service and Department of State in counter-
feiting of certain kinds of identity documents, and so on. Left to
their own devices, as they are, each will draft a strategy in which its
own agency's particular jurisdictional features are most prominent.
Yet these interests may well intersect; and a comprehensive strat-
egy, while not initially giving pre-eminence to each agency's con-
cerns may ultimately yield a much more significant outcome than
any one agency's plan.
How are federal prosecutors positioned to fill this void? It is not
a void that they can or should fill alone, as the cooperative sharing
of information and strategies will always best unilateral pronounce-
ment. Federal prosecutors are well situated to lead or be one of
the leaders in the thinking about the use and allocation of federal
resources in this area because (1) they do not need to expend re-
sources in the delicate "coordination" of investigative information,
as they already possess the investigative information of a score of
agencies; (2) they have an omnivorous crime-fighting mission,
viewing that information without the filter of agency partiality - a
position that may also make them a helpful bridge between some-
times warring agencies or jurisdictions; (3) although they can play
critically complementary roles in local initiatives and strategies, as
the Massachusetts United States Attorney's Office did in the Bos-
ton Gun Project, they also have a powerful and independent ability
to deploy comprehensive federal laws which, standing alone, will
have a significant impact on crime; and (4) they can be the natural
convenor - because of their disinterested perspective as well as
their knowledge of legal mechanisms --- to assemble the federal
players (and, in some instances, federal and local players) to devise
a mechanism to sustain long-term crime drops.
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III. Thinking Strategically: What Federal Prosecutors Should
Do About Violent Crime
Federal prosecutors sit at the center of a legion of agencies
designed to investigate and gather information. How can they har-
ness and analyze that information so that their resources are effec-
tively and systematically deployed to reduce violent crime and
maintain those reductions in the long term? First, they need to
develop the tools to help to organize and analyze the information
they already have. Second, in the context of what that information
tells them, they should use the comprehensive legal weapons they
already have to reduce crime and - where appropriate in the local
political context - to coordinate the relevant, and often, non-en-
forcement groups to implement the broader remedy that will sus-
tain those crime reductions. Finally, having made the transition
from counting cases to measuring impact, they must face the most
difficult question: what role can and should they play in affecting
the array of conditions (e.g., physical deterioration of buildings;
high truancy rates; absence of recreational opportunities for youth)
that may aggravate or depress crime conditions.
A. Harnessing resources
Federal prosecutors can be the connecting force among the in-
formation of the various federal agencies' investigations and cases.
Although this role could also be played effectively by an investiga-
tive agency head who could persuade his colleagues to share infor-
mation, the United States Attorney provides a ready platform to
support this role as this office already has access to information
from the full complement of federal and local agencies who work
with the office. In the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York, prosecutors have begun experi-
menting with one way of organizing their existing information to
highlight the connections. Critical information from every investi-
gation and case is mapped electronically, including crime locations,
defendants' addresses of residence and arrest, the locations of
search warrants and areas of knowledge by cooperators - essen-
tially organizing electronically what already exists on paper. A
prosecutor who is working on a case on a particular street corner
with, for example, the FBI, can pull up a map of the rest of the
office's cases and see whether INS just executed a search warrant
there or the DEA has a drug investigation across the street.
This program can help a federal prosecutor's office plan its strat-
egy affirmatively. It is now the only method for a prosecutor to
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view the office's entire docket at a glance. That glance might indi-
cate that ten different agencies have cases or investigations in a
particular area of the city with a severe crime problem. Knowing
about that serendipitous concentration of resources may spur the
prosecutor to meet with the agencies to discuss how their informa-
tion on the neighborhood's crime conditions intersect and how
they can ameliorate those conditions. Alternatively, the police de-
partment might share its data relating to increases in homicides in
one borough. By overlaying a map of those open homicides on a
map of the areas of knowledge of federal cooperators, the two
agencies could begin to draft a plan to develop information from
the cooperators to solve the homicides, whether those homicides
are prosecuted in the state or the federal system. Mapping is
plainly just a tool, not a strategic solution, and a tool whose use
may be limited to certain kinds of cases. But it is one example in
one subject area of how the first steps can be taken to organize
information to permit access to usable data that could help map a
strategy.
In addition to the technical tools, a prosecutor's office which is
serious about strategic deployment of its resources needs some an-
alytical and investigative help.27  This analytical/investigative
group could be used in a number of different kinds of projects of
which the following examples are but two. Imagine a neighbor-
hood that ranks among the city's top five in robbery complaints.
Solving or reducing that number can take the traditional route:
each case is worked separately for leads, witnesses and informants
until arrests are made. Or the solution could take a wholesale
route: take a year's worth of robberies and analyze what kinds of
27. This kind of help could also be usefully placed in an investigative agency. But
there are some special considerations that militate in favor of the United States Attor-
ney's Office developing this capability. First, as many of the examples in Part II illus-
trate, the agencies may not be willing to invest the necessary resources in the breadth
of examination initially undertaken to define the contours of a problem because it
may not be clear at that early stage exactly which agencies will be involved in execut-
ing the strategy. But the prosecutor's office will, whether in a large or small way, be
part of whatever strategy the research reveals is the best approach to the problem.
Second, even in simple exercises, it may be more fruitful for the prosecutor's office to
coordinate the project. In the example of the unsolved homicides being matched
against potential information from federal cooperators, whose investigator should de-
brief those cooperators? The investigative agency which arrested the cooperator may
not have the incentive to take the time to make an unrelated case - especially if that
case may be prosecuted by the state. But the prosecutor's office which signed the
agreement with the cooperator and which is responsible for bringing every aspect of
the cooperator's assistance to the judge's attention - whether it results in federal or
state prosecution - does have an incentive to ferret out this information.
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robberies these are and what the connections among them are.
Are they commercial robberies' or street robberies or residential
robberies? If they are street robberies, are they committed by
junkies looking for the fastest way to a fix or are they groups of
robbers with a shifting membership? If they are residential robber-
ies, where are the goods being fenced? Each of these scenarios
suggests a different approach. Are they better prosecuted federally
or locally, in groups or singly, are there repeat offenders who may
not be prosecutable on the robbery charge but have other open or
developing charges on which they could be held now that the rob-
bery has also been connected to them? An analytic team could
look at the year of robbery complaints and, working with the po-
lice, begin to separate out whether there are identifiable groups, or
individuals who fenced their goods interstate, or simply robbers
with other kinds of potential liability (for example, illegal aliens)
that might be worth prosecuting.
Or the team, instead of focusing on the particular problem of a
particular neighborhood, could begin to analyze a particular sub-
ject matter that cuts across many agency and prosecutorial jurisdic-
tions. In the example of the car theft and exportation rings
mentioned above,2 8 just such sets of data and interests converge.
Starting at the export end, the team could begin to compile the lists
of freight forwarders connected to the containers of suspect goods
that the Coast Guard searched and trace those shipments back to
common names or addresses. Or the team could begin to look at
the chop shops and match the chop shops against the lists of munic-
ipal violations issued by Consumer Affairs or Buildings. Or find
the list of abandoned vehicles picked up by Sanitation and deter-
mine which VIN numbers had been re-used on cars shipped out of
the country. At the outset of such a project, it would not be clear
whether the police or Customs or the FBI or the Coast Guard
would play the leading or any role. But as the data began to iden-
tify various components of the problem - and thus the solution -
any or all of these agencies would have important and delineated
roles to play.
Finally, within the United States Attorney's Office, the responsi-
bility for coordinating and directing these strategies must be as-
sumed by a high-ranking person with chain-of-command
responsibilities to ensure that the strategies are integrated into of-
fice operations and .become the way the office does business in-
28. See supra Part II.A.2.
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stead of another "project" or "initiative." 'It is, not necessary for
every prosecutor to be "converted" to a method of strategic think-
ing, as long as those responsible for setting the direction and goals
of the office are. The reigning culture of most prosecutors' offices
may make this and associated slots .difficult positions to fill because
the excitement and satisfaction of prosecuting today's mob boss
will, in most cases, outshine the prospect of devising a strategy to
ensure tomorrow's murder rate is reduced. But as this strategic
function begins to be understood as an omnivorous and essential
part of a prosecutor's job, it will become a role that prosecutors
serious about reducing crime will seek out.
B. 'The Legal Tools
What are the weapons of greatest impact that the federal prose-
cutor can mobilize? There are an array, which in a number of com-
binations can have a startling effect in a neighborhood's crime
rates. For the purposes of this discussion, however, this Article fo-
cuses on three that have either proven, or could be proven, to have
a significant and lasting effect on crime conditions: racketeering,
gun trafficking and forfeiture laws. By themselves they could dra-
matically reduce crime; in conjunction with an array of criminal,
civil and regulatory methods, both federal and local, they could be
formidably comprehensive in sustaining those crime reductions.
1. Racketeering
Some truths about crime have become self-evident. First, a small
number of people commit a large percentage of the crimes.29 If a
city has 2,000 robberies in a year, the police are not looking for
2,000 robbers; if they arrest only 200, the robbery rate will tumble.
Second, most crimes, although investigated case by case, are con-
nected to other crimes or criminals. The fact the police arrested a
defendant for a single robbery may not be entirely descriptive of
that defendant's criminal history or the history of his associates. If
both of these conclusions are true, to have the greatest beneficial
impact on a neighborhood's crime rates, law enforcement should
expand its thinking about crime from a case by case approach to an
area by area approach.
Police departments, the first line of response to violent crime,
must immediately address the individual crime that has been com-
mitted. Sometimes that means that a defendant is arrested imme-
29. See Kennedy, supra note 19, at 449, 453-54.
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diately for a relatively minor, but easy to prove violation, rather
than later for a major violation that is more descriptive of the de-
fendant's activities but harder to gather evidence on. Even when
the defendant is arrested on the significant crime, the police de-
partment's investigation still may end with the solving of that one
crime. If the investigation had continued into the array of crimes
the defendant had committed with a shifting group of associates, it
would have had a greater impact. 30
How do the racketeering laws help? The Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act 3' ("RICO") shifts the focus from a
single defendant's behavior on a particular afternoon to a group's
activities over a period of time.32 A prosecutor proving a racke-
teering case has to show that an "enterprise" or group existed and
that each charged member of that enterprise committed two or
more "acts of racketeering" over a particular stretch of time.33 The
statutorily enumerated acts of racketeering include not only fed-
eral crimes, such as Hobbs Act robbery and murder-for-hire, but
also state crimes, such as street robbery and purely local murders.34
A precinct commander confronted with a defendant who has
committed a street robbery will bring that defendant to the state
for prosecution. In New York State, after arrest, the robber will
likely be released on bail if he has strong ties to the community.3 5
Even if his criminal history shows four previous arrests for similar
crimes, there will be no remand because a demonstration of the
danger the defendant poses to the community is not a factor in
determining bail.
fNow suppose the precinct commander researches this defend-
ant's criminal history and finds that the defendant's four previous
arrests were for robbery. For a variety of reasons in three of the
cases, however, the robbery charge was pled down to a gun posses-
sion offense. With respect to the fourth arrest, the charge was dis-
missed after the victim refused to testify. More interesting, the
30. Until a few years ago, the New York City Police Department took this individ-
ualized approach to an extreme. Even where three people were reported as having
committed a robbery, the case was considered solved with the arrest of only one of
the robbers.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1998).
32. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 661, 663-71 (1987) (definitive article on the complexities, possibilities and fail-
ings of RICO, with insights into how RICO's panoramic sweep may affect prosecu-
tors' and investigators' focus on a single transaction).
33. 18 U.S.C. 88 1961(4), (5), 1962.
34. Id. § 1961(1).
35. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 1989).
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defendant committed those crimes with a revolving group of six
comrades. The commander sends out his detectives with photo-
arrays of the defendant and his six associates to show to victims of
other reported but unsolved robberies. The detectives get "hits"
on the photo-arrays in another six robbery cases with a combina-
tion of the original seven defendants.
Each of the components of a federal racketeering case of a rob-
bery crew are now in place; there is a core group of individuals who
commit a series of related crimes over a particular period of time.
None of the robberies would have been federally chargeable stand-
ing alone, but grouped in the racketeering statutes they may be
charged as state law violations. In addition, if guns were used, the
federal statutes require, upon conviction, a minimum of an initial
additional consecutive five year sentence followed by another
twenty year consecutive sentence for each additional gun.36 The
defendants appearing before a federal magistrate on the question
of bail will face a different set of standards than they did in the
state: if the prosecutor can show by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendants are a danger to the community, the judge will
order them held without bail before trial.37 The precinct com-
mander and the community are also facing a very different option
with very different outcomes from that presented by the single rob-
bery. They are assured that repeat serious offenders who had long
preyed on the community will be off the street for a long time. The
timing of the defendants' incarceration - immediately upon arrest
- may embolden other victims, who otherwise would have feared
retaliation, to come forward. Until a new group of robbers targets
that neighborhood, the robbery rate in that neighborhood will re-
main low.
Just such an experiment in the use of the racketeering laws to
reduce the murder rate was conducted in the United States Attor-
ney's Office for the Southern District of New York beginning in
1992. In 1991, murders in New York City stood at a high of 2,154.
First, haphazardly, and then more methodically, the Southern Dis-
trict began picking particularly murderous targets. From 1992
through 1996, the office filed twenty significant racketeering indict-
36. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (requiring not less than five consecutive years if gun was
used or carried, not less than seven consecutive years if gun was brandished and not
less than ten consecutive years if gun was discharged).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
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ments against violent gangs, charging 330 defendants with 205
murders.38
Some of these cases concerned criminal activity that was in-
tensely local, such as the now-extinct traditional Asian gangs which
operated largely in the Chinatown area of Manhattan. Other gangs
operated within a few square blocks of a particular neighborhood.
The police crime statistics dramatically demonstrated the immedi-
ate impact of incarcerating a small group of repeat serious offend-
ers. In the six months that preceded the November 1994 takedown
of two significant Asian gang cases, the local precinct had eight
murders and fifteen non-fatal shooting victims. 39 In the six months
that followed the takedown, the precinct had one murder and five
shooting victims. Between 1993 and 1996, the United States Attor-
ney's Office prosecuted another five Asian gang cases charging 129
defendants with thirty murders.- In 1993, the precinct had ten
murders; in 1996 it had two.
Another series of large-scale cases in the Harlem area of Man-
hattan had a similar effect. In the six months that preceded the
August 1994 arrest of one gang, the precinct reported forty-six
murders and ninety-nine non-fatal shooting victims. In the six
months that followed the takedown, the precinct had twenty
murders and forty-eight shooting victims. In 1995 and 1996, the
United States Attorney's Office prosecuted two additional gang
cases in that neighborhood, Charging thirty-six defendants with
eight murders. In 1993, the precinct had fifty-six murders; in 1996
it had twenty-eight. A neighborhood in the Mott Haven area of
the Bronx reported a parallel experience. In the seven months that
preceded the May 1994 and July 1994 take downs of a gang and its
aspiring successors, the precinct had twenty-nine murders. In the
succeeding seven-month period, the precinct had fourteen
murders.
If murderers, who surely made their debut in less serious crimes
years earlier, are taken off the streets of the neighborhoods where
they committed their offenses, crime rates will drop. What this
method lacks, however, is a serious effort to marry these one-time
"initiatives" to long-term maintenance. That long-term effort im-
plicates more than simply law enforcement resources. The last sec-
tion of this Article addresses what some of those issues are.
38. Significant racketeering indictment , here means an indictment against ten or
more defendants..
39. All statistics have been provided by the New York City Police Department (on
file with the author).
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2. Gun-trafficking
Appropriate deployment of the trafficking laws could also have
the effect of interdicting guns from a particular crime-ridden neigh-
borhood. Again, the key here is to. move from the case-by-case
method to a wholesale method that tracks the guns' movements
from the manufacturers, through the various dealers to the individ-
ual purchaser. Usually investigations start with the recovery of the
gun and work their way back. But there are other ways to identify
trafficking networks and traffickers. A city like New York, where
the vast majority of crime guns come from out of state, could rank,
not simply the top source states, but the top source stores as a first
step in turning off the spigot. Like crime statistics, it is unlikely
that the thousands of crimes involving guns recovered in a particu-
lar New York county in one year came from thousands of different
stores. This does not necessarily mean that the store or store
owner has done anything criminal, but it begins to identify the high
traffic routes which can now be worked from both the supply and
demand sides to reduce the flow of guns.
3. Forfeiture
Focusing on recidivist locations,40 as Well as recidivist individuals
could have a significant impact as every high-crime neighborhood
has at least one building that is a crime magnet for drugs, prostitu-
tion or gambling. Federal forfeiture laws are.used now against im-
portant targets but not necessarily strategically chosen ones. In a
strategically driven world, prosecutors would work with local pre-
cincts and neighborhood groups to begin to identify the range of
problem buildings. Some of those buildings may have drug and
other problems that are, for a variety of reasons, beyond the power
of a landlord to correct by himself. But other buildings may be
crime magnets because the landlord has turned a blind eye to the
activity, or in the worst case, is complicit in permitting the activity
to continue. In this situation, federal forfeiture of buildings which,
if forfeited would clean up the neighborhood, is warranted.
The federal prosecutor's role cannot end with the forfeiting of
the building. The most important steps come next as, with other
local and federal partners, the prosecutors think through a strategy
to ensure that the crime magnet building becomes a neighborhood
40. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Hot Spots-of Crime and Criminal Careers of
Places, in CRIME AND PLACE (John E. Eck & David Weisburd eds., 1985) (docu-
menting that the concentration of crime among repeat places is more intensive than
among repeat offenders).
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anchor. For example, some federal programs will enable the gov-
ernment to auction the seized buildings to non-profit groups for
minimal sums.41 A stable non-profit group might not only run the
building but train its residents in book-keeping and property man-
agement, stabilizing not only the building in the neighborhood but
its residents within the work force. A problem that began as a law
enforcement issue can resolve into a solution that not only ad-
dresses law enforcement problems but buttresses certain core val-
ues that will stabilize the neighborhood and maintain those crime
reductions.
C. Measuring Impact and Maintaining Gains
Federal prosecutions only account for a small measure of all
criminal prosecutions, but each federal prosecution can have a sig-
nificant impact.42 If prosecutors are serious about evolving from
case-processing to crime-fighting, they need to be measured where
it counts. Did their efforts have an effect on crime conditions in a
particular community or a certain subject area? The measurement
cannot simply be: did this case or series of cases reduce crime? It
must be: did this strategy - which may have included organizing
municipal regulatory restraints or a city's gang injunction statutes
in conjunction with powerful federal laws - have an impact?43
Second, and hardest of all, federal prosecutors who have moved
from cases to impact need to sort out what role they can and will
play in maintaining that impact. It may be exciting to plan and
execute enforcement initiatives, but it is also important to puzzle
through how to ensure, through daily efforts, that the effects of
those initiatives stick. Often, devising a strategy that "sticks"
means inescapably confronting social issues that crime-fighters usu-
ally eschew. If law enforcement arrests and convicts the corner
drug dealers, is their job done? In the case-processing and body-
counting world, it is. In the crime-fighting and impact-measuring
world, it is just the beginning.
In the case-processing world, the children to whom the drug
dealers paid a few dollars to run errands are not law enforcement's
41. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice, Weed and Seed Transfer Program.
42. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.1.
43. One cannot underestimate the complexity and difficulty involved in devising
these measurements - taking into account, among other things, the different ways in
which federal influence on violent crime or other white-collar crime would have to be
counted. At the very least, however, the incentive system for federal prosecutors




responsibility. But in the impact world, prosecutors or investiga-
tors could act now to ensure that in five years those children are
not their next targets. It is not that the prosecutors will run the
after-school programs, but rather that they have the wherewithal to
bring to the table the front-line service providers who know how to
make the world of legitimate work more attractive to those chil-
dren than the world of their drug-dealing friends.
This role, of convening non-traditional groups in a crime preven-
tion effort, is not an easy or an obvious one for prosecutors, espe-
cially federal prosecutors, to be part of or to find what role they
should play. But it is a crucial one. Almost every area of urban
distress is an area that has an impact on crime: the physical deterio-
ration of the housing development may invite criminal activity. In
one world, the solution may be to arrest a rapist. In another, a
light in a parking lot may prevent the rape. When truancy rates
rise so do burglary rates. Do cops burn up overtime dollars picking
up the same truants repeatedly and returning them to the school
the children will run from the next day? Or do they pool their
knowledge about the kids with front line service providers and ed-
ucators to come up with a strategy that will reduce truancy and
thus burglary rates and their overtime payments. Not incidentally,
that strategy could also return some of the children to productive
lives.
Why should law enforcement take an active role in any of these
problems? To none of these problems do law enforcement agen-
cies, or any particular agency hold the solution. But each agency
holds a piece of the puzzle: the police department knows where the
rapes occur and its police officers, who work daily with the Hous-
ing Authority, may have some influence in ensuring that a light is
put in the high crime spot; the cops see the same kids repeatedly
who, at different points in the cycle, the schools, social service
providers and others see. At every turn, federal dollars are in-
volved, if not directed towards coordinated action: a COPS grant
may have put the truant officers on the streets, HUD may be fund-
ing the Housing Authority's drug elimination efforts, and so on. A
methodical identification and use of the confluence of all this infor-
mation could play an important role in solving the immediate
crime problem and in putting in place a broader mechanism ad-
dressing all the non-enforcement aspects of the problem that could
contribute to a long-term prevention of crime.
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Conclusion
In the traditional prosecutorial world, the prosecutor sketches
the trajectory of his cases from arrest through appeal. The more
progressive and strategically minded prosecutors can push the
edges of that schematic from a focus solely on the particular (the
case) to a focus on the comprehensive (the strategy). But as he
pushes those edges, he will inevitably bump into all the other
pieces of the problem of which he has but one corner. Here there
is no schematic for the role the prosecutor should play and the
problems are more complex and less heavily scripted than the pro-
gression of a case. But as the prosecutor begins to use his position
to match the complexity of connections in the criminal world with
remedies that cut across the traditional demarcations of legal and
organizational responses, he will have taken the first step in under-
standing and defining this broader role. Having done so, he will
have made the revolutionary move from case processor to crime
fighter, concerned not only with putting the "bad guys" in jail, but
also with ensuring for the long term sustained reductions in crime.
